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LANDLORD AND TENANT-EXCULPATORY CLAUSE

LANDLORD AND TENANT -Exculpatory

Clause in Lease Void as

Against Public Policy- Cappaertv. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss.
1982).
FACTS AND HOLDING

On February 1, 1980, De Ette Junker moved into the Pecan
Ridge Apartments in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Her apartment was
on the second floor, and could be reached only by a set of metal
stairs which Ms. Junker used in common with two other tenants.
Three weeks after moving in, she signed a standard form lease
which contained a liability clause exculpating the landlord, F. L.
Cappaert, from any future acts of negligence. On the afternoon
of April 25, 1980, after a rain, Ms. Junker slipped and fell on
the stairway, sustaining severe injuries to her hip and lower back.
She brought suit against Mr. Cappaert and recovered a judgment
of $20,000.'
Immediately after the trial began, Mr. Cappaert sought to amend
his answer in order to introduce the exculpatory clause of the lease
as evidence that Ms. Junker had expressly assumed the risk for
injuries caused by his negligence. The trial judge allowed the
amendment, but refused to allow the jury to be instructed as to
the provisions of the clause on the grounds that it should be void
as against public policy. On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that in the future exculpatory clauses in residential leases, insofar as they defeat the liability of a landlord for
"negligence in maintaining the common area on the leased
premises," shall be void as contrary to public policy.'
BACKGROUND

An exculpatory clause in a property lease is designed to insure
that the lessor is immune to tort liability for any acts of negligence
for which a court will allow him the affirmative defense of assumption of risk.' Until recently such clauses have been held valid,'
1. Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982). The exculpatory clause in question read
as follows:
The Lessor shall not be liable to Lessee, or to Lessee's employees, patrons and visitors,
or to any other person for any damage to person or property caused by any act, omission
or neglect of Lessor or any other tenant of said demised premises, and Lessee agrees to
hold Lessor harmless from all claims for any such damage, whether the injury occurs on
or off the leased premises.
Id. at 379.
2. Id.at 382.
3. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 233[4], at 370.18 (rev. ed. 1982); W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 469B (1965); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 23 (1971).
4. E.g., O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 11. 2d 436, 155 N.E. 2d 545 (1958).
For collated cases upholding the validity of exculpatory clauses see Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 321,
328 (1973).
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even though public policy clearly favors the notion that a person
should be responsible for negligent conduct. To understand why
courts have validated an apparently disfavored agreement, it is
necessary to consider the history of a lessor's immunity in general.
The earliest leases, dating from the eleventh century, were
essentially construed as contracts.' By the sixteenth century,
however, leaseholds were firmly established as conveyances of
property and a lease was considered to be the equivalent of a "sale
of the premises for an indicated term."6 Once the lease was executed, the lessor effectively surrendered possession and control
of the property to the lessee.' Moreover, given the predominantly agricultural nature of leaseholds, and the general absence of
structures on the leased property, the prospective lessee was better able to inspect the premises prior to leasing them and then
later to maintain them himself.' Under these conditions the immunity of the lessor for any injuries the lessee might suffer during the term of the lease seemed self-evident, and no one was
likely to question the doctrine of caveat lessee.9
Like most rules of law, the complementary doctrines of caveat
lessee and lessor's tort immunity began, over a period of time,
to generate exceptions. Beginning in the nineteenth century, as
population shifted along the rural-to-urban continuum, the creation of exceptions accelerated.'" Even though courts continued to
assume that a lease was a conveyance of property, and thereby
refused to shift the burden of liability from lessee to lessor, they
were not unmindful of the injustices resulting from the increased
vulnerability of lessees." Fewer and fewer leaseholds consisted
5. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective:From Status to Contract and Back
in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REV. 369 at 371 (1961).
6. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:10, at 109 (1980); 2
R. POWELL, supra note 3, 221[1], at 179; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 63, at 399; Love,
Landlord's Liabilityfor Defective Premises:Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975
Wis. L. REV. 19, 23-26 (1975).
7. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 17.1, at705 (1974); W. PROSSER, supra note
3, § 63, at 400; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:1 at 186; Love, supra note 6, at49.
8. Quinn and Phillips, The Law of the Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 226-27 (1969); R. SCHOSHiNSKi, supra
note J6,§ 4:1, at 187.
9. 2 R. POWELL, supra note 3, 233 [1]at332-33, 225 [2][9] at 254; R. SCHOSHINSKI,
supra note 6, § 3:10, at 110, § 4:1, at 186.
10. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:1, at187; Annot., 64 A.L.R. 3d 339, 342 (1975).
11. Love, supra note 6, at49. Courts inone jurisdiction have setaside the traditional rule
of lessor immunity altogether, substituting a standard of reasonable care which must be met by
the lessor under virtually all circumstances. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 338, 308 A. 2d 528 (1973).
Courts in three other jurisdictions have shown a willingness to follow Sargent inreasoning that
the implied warranty of habitability requires that the lessor be held to the ordinary negligence
standard. Crowe)) v. McCaffrey, 377 Mass. 433, 386 N.E. 2d 1256 (1979); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979); Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 68 Ohio
St. 2d 20, 427 N.E.2d 774 (1981); Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 339 (1975).
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of rural farm land inhabited by people whose experience and skills
allowed them to prevent the occurrence of dangerous conditions.
Instead, the greater number of leaseholds were now complex urban structures inhabited by people who lacked the self-sufficiency
of the rural lessee and who were dependent on the lessor to insure that the leased premises were reasonably safe."2 Faced with
these changed conditions, yet evidently reluctant to overturn the
traditional rule of tort immunity for the lessor, the courts over
time devised ways to avoid that rule by finding exceptions to its
applicability.1
As the courts found exceptions to the lessor's tort immunity,
the lessor responded by seeking out methods of keeping that immunity intact. Hence the exculpatory clause, inserted in the lease
to modify tort liability by contract, and aimed at expressly shifting the burden of the risk back to the lessee.'
Ironically, it seems certain that statutes adopted by a number
of states in the late nineteenth century which were intended to
impose a duty of repair on urban lessors, also paved the way for
lessors to avoid any duty whatsoever. The following language is
typical:

12. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:1, at 187.
13. At common law, the lessor's immunity to tort liability has now been excepted in seven
ways. If the lessee is injured because of latent defects which the lessor knew or should have known
about but failed to disclose at the time the lease was executed, the lessor will be held liable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.1 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 358 (1965). Should the premises be leased for the purpose of admitting the public,
the lessor will be liable for injuries to third persons resulting from latent defects. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.2 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 359 (1965). In the case of furnished, single-family dwellings leased for a short period, the lessor
will be held to a standard of due care on the grounds that the lessee lacks the leisure time to inspect the premises. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 3:11, at 110; Love, supra note 6, at 54.
When a lease contains a covenant to repair, the lessor will be held liable for injuries resulting
from breach of the covenant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT)
§ 17.5 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965). In the absence of a specific covenant
to repair, the lessor will still be held liable if he voluntarily undertakes to perform repairs and

does so negligently.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) §

17.7

(1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965). In the case of leases involving multifamily dwellings such as apartment houses or complexes, the lessor remains liable for injuries
caused by failure to maintain common areas and approaches in a reasonably safe condition. Here
the original conditions giving rise to lessor's immunity (i.e., that the lessor has yielded possession
and control of the demised premises) no longer apply. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(LANDLORD AND TENANT) §§ 17.3, 17.4 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 360, 361
(1965). Finally, courts will impose tort liability under a type of negligence per se theory should
the lessor be found to have violated the provisions of a housing code which carries criminal sanctions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.6 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(b) (1965).

14. Comment, Exculpatory Clausesin Leases, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 538 (1959); Note, Country
Club Apartments v. Scott: Exculpatory Clauses in Leases Declared Void, 32 MERCER L. REV.
419, 421 (1980).
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The lessor of a building for the occupation of human beings must, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such occupation,
and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenantable."

As one writer has observed, the phrase "In the absence of an
agreement to the contrary" clearly suggests that exculpatory clauses
can be employed and will be enforced. 6 It is not surprising, then,
that the standard form leases which evolved in the twentieth century typically contained clauses exculpating the lessor from liability
for any future acts of negligence.17
When they are confronted with the attirmative defense of express assumption of risk evidenced by an exculpatory clause in
an executed lease, courts must essentially balance the value of
freedom of contract and the value of encouraging widespread consciousness of the duty to exercise due care. 8 Traditionally, courts
have found that the value of freedom of contract is paramount. 9
Courts have also been disposed to uphold the validity of exculpatory clauses on the theory that a rental lease primarily
represents a private transaction and therefore lies beyond the reach
of public policy. " In addition, a few courts have validated exculpatory clauses because evidence indicated that the clause was
agreed to by the lessee in consideration of lower rent. "
Even when courts have found exculpatory clauses valid, the
15. CIVIL CODE OF CALIF., § 1942 (1872), quoted in Comment, supra note 14, at 538-39.
16. Comment, supra note 14, at 539.
17. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4: 10, at 206; Love, supra note 6, at 81. The exculpatory
clause at issue in the instant case, supra note 1, may be compared with the following typical "standard
form" exculpatory clause:
It is mutually agreed between the parties hereto that the lessor shall not be liable for any
damage of whatsoever kind, or by whomsoever caused, to person or property of the lessee
or to anyone on or about the premises by consent of the lessee, however caused and whether
due in whole or in part to acts of negligence on the part of the lessor, his agents or servants, whether such acts be active or passive, and the lessee agrees to hold the lessor harmless
against all such damage claims.
Jones, An ExculpatoryProvision That Will Protect the Lessor, 1946 INs. L.J. 79, 93 (1946), quoted
in R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:10, at 207.
18. See Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941); McCutcheon v. United Home
Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971), noted in Note, supra note 14, at 421 n. 15.
See also Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E. 2d 721 (1953).
19. Baker v. Wheeler, Lacey & Brown, Inc., 272 Ala. 101, 128 So. 2d 721 (1961); O'Callaghan
v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Il. 2d 436, 155 N.E. 2d 545 (1958); Weirick v. Hamm
Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175 (1929); Bryans v. Gallagher, 407 Pa. 142, 178 A.
2d 766 (1962); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:10, at 207-08.
20. Eastern Ave. Corp. v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962); O'Callaghan v. Waller
& Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E. 2d 545 (1958); Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245 (1932); R. SCHOSHINSI, supra note 6,
§ 4:10, at 208.
21. Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, 160 A. 595, 597 (1932); R. SCHOSHtNSK, supra note 6
§ 4:10, at 208.
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clause has been construed strictly in favor of the lessee.2" In some
instances in which courts have apparently upheld the general rule
of validity, the construction against the lessor has been so strict
that "the obvious intent and result is the practical emasculation
of the clauses. "123
The use of strict construction has not been the only means
employed by courts to avoid the potentially harsh effects of exculpatory clauses. As in the case of the caveat lessee rule, the
rule that exculpatory clauses will be upheld has generated a number
of exceptions. Thus courts have diverged from the rule and invalidated exculpatory clauses where the parties to a lease were
in positions of unequal bargaining power,2" where the negligence
of the lessor was gross, or merely active rather than passive, 25
where the lessee clearly lacked awareness or understanding of the significance of the clause,2" where particular circumstances might render the clause unconscionable, 7 where the
lease was residential rather than commercial,28 where a ruling
which validated the clause would permit the lessor to escape a

22. See generally 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 17.1 at 711-13 (listing various fact situations which courts have found not to be covered by the terms of exculpatory clauses); R. SCHOSHINsKu, supra note 6, § 4:11, at 209 (additional fact situations not covered); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence
§ 31 (1971).
23. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 327 (1973).
24. Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (dictum); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257
Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 11 A.2d
425 (1955); Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966) (dictum); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d
321, 339-42 (1973). R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:12, at 212.
25. Baker v. Wheeler, Lacey and Brown, Inc., 272 Ala. 101, 128 So. 2d 721 (1961); Mills
v. Rappert, 167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (1959); Brady v. Glosson, 87 Ga. App. 476,
74 S.E.2d 253 (1953); Schratter v. Development Enterprises, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 459 (Tenn. App.
1979); Queen Ins. Co. v. Kaiser, 27 Wis. 2d 571, 135 N.W.2d 247 (1965); 2 M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 7, § 17.1, at 709; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 342-44.
26. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Old Town Dev. Co.
v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.1976) (dictum); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 17.1
(Supp. 1982); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 344-45 (1973).
27. Hawes v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 117 Ga. App. 771, 162 S.E.2d 14 (1968); Strauch v.
Charles Apartments Co., 1111. App. 3d 57, 273 N.E.2d 19 (1971); Casey v. Lupkes, 286 N.W.2d
204 (Iowa 1979); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955);
College Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffman, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174 (1976);
R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:12, at 213; Love, supra note 6, at 85-86; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d
321, 345 (1973). See generally Comment, A Flexible Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory
Clauses in the StandardForm Lease, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 520 (1972) (suggesting that courts measure
all standard form exculpatory clauses in landlord tenant leases by the test of "unconscionability").
28. Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 575 P. 2d 465, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1978); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super 575, 111 A.2d 144 (1955); McCutcheon
v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971) (limited to multi-family dwellings); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 17.1 at 709; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6 § 4:12, at 210.
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statutory duty, "9 and where the lease involved public housing 3 1
The courts of only one jurisdiction-New Hampshire-have
gone so far as to hold that any attempt by a landlord to bargain
away liability for future negligence will be found void as contrary to public policy. 3 Other courts have distinguished between
residential and commercial leases, ruling that exculpatory clauses
in most residential leases will be voided as against public policy .32
Such a distinction appears to have the effect of overturning the
general rule that exculpatory clauses will be upheld,3" since attempts at exculpation in commercial leases are frequently defeated
under the unconsionability provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.34 Given the commercial character of leases in large
apartment complexes, courts in the future possibly will treat exculpatory clauses in such quasi-commercial leases after the fashion
of the 1963 California case of Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California,"s where the court proposed to test the validity of exculpatory clauses by asking whether a given clause contravened
some "public interest." 6 Although designed for application to
business leases, the Tunkl test could also be used to evaluate such
standard form apartment complex leases as the one in the instant
case.
Although courts have been slow to obviate the rule granting
29. Tenants Council of Tiber Island - Carrollsburg Square v. De Franceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560
(D.D.C. 1969); Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969); Boyd v. Smith, 327
Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 17.1, at 710; R. SCHOSHINSKI,
supra note 6, § 4:12, at 211; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 351-55 (1973).
30. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943);
Texas v. Housing Authority of Dallas, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); Thomas v. Housing Authority
of Bremerton, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 17.1,
at 710; R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:12 at 211.
31. Papakolos v. Shaka, 91 N.H.265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941). Refusing to allow the defendant's
assumption of risk argument, the court applied "our rule that one may not by contract relieve
himself from the consequences of the future non-performance of his common-law duty to exercise ordinary care." Id. at 379.
32. Tenants Council of Tiber Island - Carrollsburg Square v. De Franceaux, 305 F. Supp.
560 (D.D.C. 1969); Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143
Cal. Rptr. 247 (1978); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111A.2d 144 (1955);
McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443,486 P.2d 1093 (1971). But see College
Mobile Home Park and Sales, Inc. v. Hoffman, 72 Wis. 2d 514, 241 N.W.2d 174, 177 (1976)
(arguing that the categorical distinction between residential and commercial leases is "artificial
and arbitrary," and that each case should be tried according to the facts of its particular setting).
33. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, 346 (1973).
34. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); Love, supra note 6, at 85-86; Comment, supra note 27, at 529-30.
35. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 483 P. 2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
36. The relevant portion of the opinion reads as follows:
In placing particular contracts within or without the category of those affected with a public
interest, the courts have revealed a rough outline of that type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid. Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seek-
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validity to exculpatory clauses, 7 state legislatures have proven
more responsive to the demands created by the changed nature
of most leaseholds. In Cappaert v. Junker, the Mississippi
Supreme Court cites four states with statutes voiding exculpatory
clauses in residential leases, 8 but the actual list of states with
similar statutes is much longer. 9 Given the fact that most of these
statutes have been passed within the last ten to fifteen years,'° and
given the strict scrutiny courts have begun applying to exculpatory
clauses in recent decades, it is not surprising that the Mississippi
Supreme Court has brought itself in line with an increasingly clear
trend in the law.

ing exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which
is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks
it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result
of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power
the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and
makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain
protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness
by the seller or his agents.
383 P. 2d at 444-46 (footnotes omitted).
37. In its opinion in the instant case, the Mississippi Supreme Court cites eight jurisdictions
in which an exculpatory clause was judicially voided as against public policy (Florida, Indiana,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia),
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 381 (Miss. 1982), but only New Hampshire courts have
clearly set the rule aside altogether, Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
38. Cappaert, 413 So. 2d at 381. The states cited with applicable statutes are Illinois: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); Maryland: MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 8-105 (1974); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, §15 (West Supp. 1980); and
New York: N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1978). The Maryland statute applies
only to portions of the premises retained under the lessor's control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.3, Comment m. (1977).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.040(a)(3) (Supp. 1982); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315
(A)(3)(1974); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1953 (West Supp. 1982) (clause unenforceable if it purports
to relieve the lessor from a statutory duty); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-4(a)(3)(1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5515 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.47 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-102 (Supp. 1981) (applied in County Club Apartments, Inc. v. Scott, 246 Ga. 443, 271 S.E.2d
841 (1980)); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-33 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 562 A. I I (West Supp.
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2547(a)(4) (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.570(l)(d)
(1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-202(3) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(l)(d) (1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 118 A. 220(l)(d) (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(D) (Baldwin
1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 113(A)(4) (West Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §
66-28-203(a)(2) (1982); VA. CODE § 55-248.9(a)(4) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
59.18.230(2)(d) (Supp. 1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT)
§ 17.3 Comment m (1977); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:13, at 34 n. 76 (Supp. 1982).
40. Most of the statutes passed in recent years are patterned closely after the MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-406 (Tent. Draft 1969) or the UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT ACT § 1.403 (1972).
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LESSOR'S IMMUNITY AND EXCULPATORY
CLAUSES IN MISSISSIPPI

The history of the lessor's tort immunity in Mississippi has been
generally consistent with the larger history outlined above.' In
the early case of Jones v. Millsaps,"2 the Mississippi Supreme
Court established the rule that there is no implied warranty of
habitability in leaseholds, and concomittantly that there is no liability on the lessor's part for injuries suffered by the lessee. 3 The
lessee "takes the premises as he finds them," and "must use his
own faculties, and judge for himself if the premises he desires
to lease are in repair, and are suitable for his use."" The message
is clear: caveat lessee. At the same time the court, in distinguishing
another case, gave notice of one of the traditional exceptions to
the rule of lessor's immunity, that of negligence involving common areas. 4
In later cases the court recognized exceptions as to negligent
repairs 6 and latent defects. It also confirmed the suggestion in
Jones that there should be an exception for common areas retained under the lessor's control. 4 ' To date the court has refused
to grant an exception in cases where injuries to the lessee occur
as a result of the lessor's breach of a contractual duty to repair, 9

41. For a more detailed discussion of the history of Mississippi law in the area of lessor's immunity, see Note, Landlord and Tenant -Express Exculpatory Provision That Does Not Contravene
Public Policy is Valid and is to Be Given Full Effect, 50 Miss. L.J. 921, 922-35 (1979) (analyzing Smith v. Smith, 375 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 1979)).
42. 71 Miss. 10, 14 So. 440 (1893).
43. Id. at 15, 18, 14 So. 440-41.
44. Id. at 18, 14 So. 441.
45. Justice Woods observed regarding the case of Looney v. McLean, 129 Mass. 33 (1880),
that it had held that "a landlord who lets rooms in a tenement house to different tenants, with
a right of way in common over a staircase, is bound to keep such staircase in repair; but that
is not the case at bar." Id. at 17-18, 14 So. 441. For the list of common law exceptions to the
rule of lessor's immunity, see supra note 13.
46. Green v. Long, 152 Miss. 117, 118 So. 705 (1928) (no implied covenant to repair, but
repairs voluntarily undertaken and negligently performed may result in liability); accord Ford
v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Comm., 223 Miss. 630, 78 So. 2d 743 (1955); Kassis v. Perrone, 209 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 1968).
47. Rich v. Swalm, 161 Miss. 505, 137 So. 325 (1931) (as a rule the lessee takes the premises
as he finds them, but liability may result if the lessor fails to make known dangerous conditions
existing on the premises at the time of the lease); accord Loflin v. Thornton, 394 So. 2d 905
(Miss. 1981).
48. Hiller v. Wiley, 192 Miss. 488, 6 So. 2d 317 (1942) (sustaining suggestions of error in
decision rendered in Hiller v. Wiley, 192 Miss. 488, 5 So. 2d 489 (1942)) (there will be liability
for injuries suffered by the tenant as a result of the landlord's failure to maintain common areas
and approaches in a reasonably safe condition).
49. Rich, 161 Miss. at 507-08, 137 So. at 327 (where the lessor covenants to repair, the action
should be for breach of contract rather than for tort damages); accordFord v. Pythian Bondholders
Protective Comm., 223 Miss. at 641-46, 78 So. 2d at 747-49 (refusing to apply RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965), which states the common law rule holding the lessor liable
for damages resulting from breach of a covenant to repair).
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unless the lease-contract specifies that the lessor will repair a particular, designated defect and the injuries to the lease result from
his failure to do so.50
In regard to exculpatory clauses in leases, the first case to reach
the court was Smith v. Smith in 1979.1 Prior to that date the court
had considered exculpatory clauses only in the context of common carrier contracts, and had found them void for public policy
reasons. " In Smith, the plaintiff had leased space in a shopping
center from the defendant. The lease contained a clause whereby
the lessor agreed to maintain the roof, the foundation, and the
exterior walls in "a tenantable condition."" The lease also contained an exculpatory clause by which the lessee agreed not to
hold the lessor liable for "any damages to persons or property . .""
The roof subsequently leaked, damaging a substantial amount of
merchandise, and the plaintiff sued. The defendant answered that
the exculpatory clause was a "complete defense.""
The majority in Smith held that the exculpatory clause was valid,
in effect allowing the defendant-lessor to give with one hand and
take away with the other. 6 Paying virtually no attention to the
issue of the defendant's express covenant to repair, 7 the majority
instead addressed itself to the exculpatory clause and the reasons
for upholding it. 8 The operative fact in the case would appear
to be the possibility that the defendant was negligent in failing
to keep his promise to repair, coupled with the court's reluctance
in the past to recognize such negligence as an exception to the
rule on lessor's immunity.5 9 Rather than confront the issue of
Mississippi's failure to recognize the common law exception, the

50. Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935) (the landlord promised to repair
an unsafe porch).
51. 375 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 1979).
52. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Harris, 108 Miss. 574, 67 So. 54 (1914) (upholding exculpatory
agreement would contravene the comparative negligence statute); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bassett,
111 Miss. 468, 71 So. 750 (1916) (telegraph companies are common carriers under Miss. CONST.
art. 7, § 195, and cannot limit their liability for negligence).
53. 375 So. 2d at 1042.
54. Id.
55. Id. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-59 (1972).
56. The opinion is analyzed more fully in Note, supra note 41, at 935-39.
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. 375 So. 2d at 1042-43. In validating the clause, the court considered three factors: the
lessor did not retain control over the inventory of the store, there was no public interest involved,
and there was no unequal bargaining power.
59. Note, supra note 41, at 937.
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court narrowed its scope to one clause in the lease instead of two. "
Had the court taken the initiative and established the exception
for Mississippi law, 6 it may in turn have found that this newlyrecognized positive duty could not be bargained away without contravening public policy. 2
In the instant case, the court is once again preoccupied with
the relationship between a common law exception to the doctrine
of lessor's tort immunity and an exculpatory clause. The court
begins its argument by defining a lease as "a conveyance of property for a specified period of time,"'" i.e., it defines a lease by
the traditional common law standard. 4 On that assumption, the
rule of caveat lessee established in Jones v. Millsaps still applies"
and Cappaert, even if negligent, will not be held liable for the
injuries to Junker. However, Cappaert is not immune from liability
at common law, because Mississippi courts recognize the exception for common areas.66 The question then becomes: If the lessor
here is liable for injuries to the lessee, can he avoid the liability
under the exculpatory clause in the lease?67
Having noted the conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions
as to the validity of exculpatory clauses, the court chooses to join
with those who are willing to void the clause under certain
circumstances.68 Its rationale is twofold. First, a lease such as the
one in this case, between one landlord and multiple tenants, cannot be construed as a private affair lacking public interest. The
traditional image of a single landlord and single tenant, bargaining at arm's length in a private transaction, does not coincide with
the realities of modern apartment house living, where one lessor
60. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sugg (joined by Robertson, P. J. and Bowling, J.)contrives an equitable method for giving validity to both clauses. Citing the strong policy which favors
giving effect to the intent of the parties to a contract, Justice Sugg argues that the exculpatory
clause could be held valid except insofar as it would defeat the intent of the repair clause. 375
So. 2d at 1043-44. (Sugg, J., dissenting). Note that Justice Sugg's argument also avoids the issue
of whether Mississippi should recognize the common law exception as regards covenants to repair.
61. See generally, Note, supra note 41, which makes a strong case in favor of such an initiative.
62. Such a conclusion would coincide with the rationale of the instant case.
Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1982).
63. 413 So. 2d at 379. Justice Sugg wrote for the unanimous court. Note that Justice Sugg's
construction of a lease as a conveyance appears to contradict his construction of a lease as a contract in the Smith dissent, 375 So. 2d 1041, 1043-44 (Miss. 1979) (Sugg, J.,dissenting). The
contradiction may perhaps be explained by the differences in the fact situations between the two
cases (e.g., Smith involved a commercial lease and damage to property while Cappaertinvolved
a residential lease and injury to a person), or it may have resulted from the traditional confusion
of the two concepts. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 11.
64. R. SCHOSHtNSKI, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
65. 413 So. 2d at 379; see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
66. 413 So. 2d at 379.
67. Id. at 380.
68. Id. at 382.
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may have executed standard form leases with hundreds or even
thousands of lessees. 9 Second, and more significantly, the lessor
here should not be allowed to avoid tort liability for his breach
of a positive duty so firmly rooted in common law. The rule having clearly established that a landlord shall be liable for his
negligence in failing to maintain to a reasonable degree of safety
those common areas retained under his control, the court finds
that "the exculpatory clause, insofar as it seeks to immunize appellant against damages caused by his negligence in maintaining
the common area on the leased premises..., is void as against
public policy."70
The court concludes that it is not expressing an opinion as to
whether or not the exculpatory clause is valid in regard to areas
of the leased premises not under the lessor's control, because that
question is not before it.7" The court then goes on to distinguish
Smith, observing that there the lessor was not under a common
law duty to repair the roof. In the words of the court, "[t]he present case is entirely different from Smith .... 72

CONCLUSION

As regards the principal issues in Cappaert,the state of the law
in Mississippi is as follows. First, the common law rule is still
intact which grants a landlord immunity from liability for injuries
to a tenant. Three traditional exceptions to this rule have been clearly established -undisclosed latent defects, negligent repairs voluntarily undertaken, and unsafe common areas-but Mississippi
remains among the minority in its refusal to recognize the exception for breach of a covenant to repair. It is problematical whether
the court would recognize other common exceptions should such
cases come before it. 73 Second, that rule is also still intact granting validity to exculpatory clauses in residential leases but the court
has now established an exception to that rule as regards common
areas and approaches. Given the court's reason for doing so -that
a firmly established common law duty ought not be bar69. Id. at 381. The court draws extensively from the rationale of the similar case of McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971).
70. 413 So. 2d at 382.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. In Cappaert the court, in discussing the duty which a landlord has under exceptions to
the rule of immunity, refers to "common law or statutory duty." Id. This seems to indicate that
Mississippi would recognize the exception, which has been established elsewhere, holding the
landlord liable should he breach a statutory duty.
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gained away-it seems certain that it would also void clauses seeking to exculpate a landlord from liability for injuries resulting from
undisclosed latent defects, or for injuries resulting from negligent
repairs voluntarily undertaken.
While the court could have declared all exculpatory clauses in
residential leases void, it is unreasonable to find fault with it for
not doing so. Like other courts which have considered exculpatory
clauses, the court in Cappaertwas forced to balance two objectives which are both firmly supported by public policy: the freedom
to contract, and the necessity of exercising due care. The scales
tipped toward the latter policy in this fact situation -most notable
among the facts being the apartment complex setting-but in
another fact situation the scales could tip the other way. Mississippi
is far from being an urban state, and many if not most of the rental
leases are still for one- or two-family dwellings. A blanket invalidation of exculpatory clauses in residential leases could conceivably
interfere unreasonably with agreements that are genuinely private
affairs, and could defeat legitimate contractual intentions.
One avenue the courts in Mississippi might wish to explore in
the future is pointed out in the early case of Illinois Central R.R.
Co. v. Harris." In Harris the Mississippi Supreme Court voided
an exculpatory clause because it would effectively repeal the state's
comparative negligence statute.' 5 Under the comparative negligence
standard, liablity is apportioned according to degrees of negligence;
an exculpatory clause contravenes the standard because it fixes
the liability a priori on one side only. It is not beyond the realm
of credibility to predict that the court might in some future case
apply the Harris rationale.
It is a stronger possibility that the Mississippi legislature will
take the matter out of the court's hands. As pointed out earlier,
approximately one half of the states in the United States have now
enacted statutes which declare exculpatory clauses in rental leases
to be void, and nearly all of these statutes have gone on the books
within the last decade. " Bills modeled on the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act have been introduced in each of the last
six sessions of the Mississippi legislature, and have been killed
each time, 7' but one senses that the persistence of the sponsors
108 Miss. 574, 67 So. 54 (1914).
The court argued that "the policy of the state, reflected in its laws, cannot be bargained
in this manner." Id. at 578, 67 So. 56.
R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 4:13 at 48 n.76 (Supp. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
PROPERTY (LANDLORD AND TENANT) § 17.3 Comment m (1977).

74.
75.
away
76.
OF

77. The (Jackson) Clarion-Ledger, Feb. 2, 1983, at B6, col. 2.
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will inevitably be rewarded. To recast an old legal chestnut, one
can argue that since the reason for the rule exists, the rule should
exist.

Daniel G. Hise

